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1. INTRODUCTION 
The Asian financial crisis of 1997 seriously affected the Korean economy causing a 
number of highly leveraged Korean firms, especially those belonging to large business 
groups or chaebols, to become bankrupt. The bankruptcies, in turn, adversely affected 
financial institutions that had been intricately linked to such firms. The dramatic capital 
outflow as foreign investors lost confidence in Asian economies, including Korea, has 
been identified as a main cause of the financial crisis. Highly leveraged firms were not 
only affected during the crisis, but also had to endure heavy restructuring in the post-crisis 
period. Following the outbreak of the Asian financial crisis in late-1997, the issue of highly 
leveraged Korean firms has become and important one. The crisis, initially triggered by the 
sudden outflow of foreign capital that caused a liquidity crisis in the banking sector, 
exposed other structural weaknesses in the economy including its corporate sector. 
Another critical factor behind the crisis was the excessive investment by firms, which is 
connected to inefficient lending by financial institutions to low profitability firms.  
In November 21, 1997, the Korean Minister of Finance and Economy resigned and the 
succeeding minister had little choice but to ask for IMF assistance. The Korean media 
declared the country bankrupt as thousands of companies went out of business. Foreign 
investors fled the country and major banks became insolvent. These were only some of the 
effects of the Asian financial crisis that had began in July 1997 with the devaluation of the 
Thai bath, to be followed by Indonesia, Malaysia, and other neighboring Asian countries. 
In the aftermath of the crisis, Korean firms have been asked to restructure their corporate 
finance, i.e. mainly to reduce their dependence on debt (Fattouh, Scaramozzino and Harris, 
2004). There is growing literature analyzing the causes and consequences of the Asian 
financial crisis that attributes the economy’s vulnerability to high leverage (Choi, 2000).  
This study adopts the optimal capital structure theory to explain the determinants of capital 
structure and the speed of adjustment of Korean firms. Capital structuring and, in particular, 
establishing the optimal capital structure, has for a long time been important areas of 
debate among academicians and practitioners alike. Academically, the problem is 
appealing because it is fairly open-ended question subject to controversies and criticisms. 
Particularly, this study pays attention to Koreans firms in examining how firms might 
choose their capital structures considering Korea-specific corporate features and the 
importance of leverage. This paper provides a comprehensive analysis of how a set of 
observable variables might affect capital structure choices in Korea. In addition, possible 
shifts in the impacts of individual factors and the overall adjustment in capital structure in 
relation with the financial crisis is estimated. 
Although the analysis is based on a dynamic model, for the purpose of comparison, this 
study also includes the typical static model whose results are contrasted to that of the 
dynamic model. Looking ahead, it is found that the dynamic model is the preferred model. 
The following differentiate this paper from other existing literature; the study 1) provides a 
distinction between the observed and the estimated optimal debt ratio, 2) empirically 
identifies factors determining the optimal debt level, 3) captures the dynamics of capital 
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adjustment model where firm-specific and time-specific factors determining the speed of 
adjustment are identified and their impacts are quantified, and 5) studies the capital 
structure of a sample of 617 Korean listed non-financial companies between 1985 and 
2002.  
This study identifies the key determinants of capital structure among the listed Korean 
firms. It is found that some variables are insignificant such as income variability, 
uniqueness, and trend, while other variables including growth, tangibility, and the crisis 
were found to be highly significant. Moreover, the 1997 crisis, and firm size, measured by 
the volume of sales, had a clear influence on the speed of adjustment in the observed 
capital structure towards the optimal level.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the theory of 
capital structure and a brief literature review of empirical studies. Section 3 contains the 
background of financial markets in Korea. Section 4 describes the data and methodology 
and presents the empirical model. Section 5 reports the data, which is followed by a listing 
of the determinants of capital structure and speed of adjustment in Section 6. Section 7 
summarizes the results of the empirical study. Section 8 concludes and an Appendix 
provides statistical tables.  
 
2. THEORIES OF CAPITAL STRUCTURE OF FIRMS 
The modern theory of capital structure is said to have began with Modigliani and Miller’s 
seminal paper in 1958 entitled “The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and the Theory 
of Investment” (MM thereafter). Since then a number of theories have been put forward in 
order to explain the variation in debt ratios across firms. The capital structure theory 
suggests that firms determine what is often referred to as a target debt ratio, which is based 
on various tradeoffs between the costs and benefits of debt versus equity. Although the 
MM hypothesis, assuming perfectly and complete capital market structures, argues that the 
leverage of a firm is independent to, and thus uncorrelated with, its market value, in the 
real world, bankruptcy costs, agency costs, costs derived from asymmetric information and 
incompleteness in markets are common, and there is a growing literature that tries to 
incorporate such issues in their analysis of the determinants of capital structure. In this 
section, some theoretical factors that determine the capital structure and speed of 
adjustment of firms are discussed. There are three important and common theories 
developed to explain the capital structure’s relevancy to firm value, which are based on 
bankruptcy costs, agency costs, and the costs deriving from asymmetric information ( what 
is known as the Pecking Order Theory). 
A. Bankruptcy Cost 
Bankruptcy costs refer to costs that occur when a firm fails to pay back its principal of debt 
in the event that they over-borrow. As debt increases, the possibility of default also rises as 
well, and in such a case, firms may begin to face financial distress. For example, firms 
might not be able to distribute dividends on preferred stocks and, consequently, their 
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limitations can affect a firm’s value and its performance, as eventually they might have to 
give up on attractive investment opportunities, which could adversely affect profitability 
opportunities. In turn, the firm’s bankruptcy probability could increase in extreme 
situations. Since an increase in firm value caused by a reduction in income tax may be 
offset by an increase in expected bankruptcy costs, which worsens the firm’s value, the 
existence of such tradeoffs implies that an optimal capital structure exists and can be found.  
B. Agency Cost 
Agency costs arise because of differences in the interests of principal and agents, both of 
who maximize their own objectives. Hence, the principal usually imposes some set of 
restrictions on agents’ behaviour to align their actions with the principal’s objectives. This 
usually involves monitoring the behaviour of agents as well. Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
identify agency costs, which may be monetary or non-monetary, as consisting of 
monitoring cost, bonding cost, and residual loss. Accordingly, there can be two types of 
agency costs, namely, agency costs of equity associated with the issuance of stocks 
(equity), and agency cost of debt associated with the issuance of debt.  
The agency cost of debt occurs when there exists some conflict of interest between 
shareholders and debtors since such conflicts may interrupt further investment or financing 
activities, thereby adding extra costs in managing such difficulties. Shareholders may be 
strongly tempted to maximize their own interests rather than maximize the entire value of 
firms, which becomes a cost for debtors, especially when they are faced with an extremely 
vulnerable situation, such as bankruptcy, and the CEO, the agent, who represents the 
interests of shareholders may behave in such a way to maximize the wealth or interests of 
shareholders. This type of game can be caused by ‘risk incentives’, ‘under-investment 
incentives’, and/or ‘cash in run’. 
As the debt of firms increases the bankruptcy cost and agency cost of firm rises, and it is 
through this argument that agency costs can be incorporated into the capital structure 
decision. That is, the use of debt is associated with a rise in the value of a firm for the 
reduced income tax effect, a positive effect, and the increase in costs of financial distress, a 
negative effect, simultaneously. Thus, due to such tradeoffs, the optimal capital structure 
may exist and can be found 
C. Pecking Order Theory  
Often in corporate financing decision, however, it has been observed that a firm tends to 
draw on firstly internal financing, and then look to external financing later by issuing 
shares or corporate bonds in the financial market when there is insufficient funds for 
internal financing. According to Myers (1984), such a pattern of corporate financing is 
largely motivated by information asymmetry between the insiders, which is the managers, 
and the external investors. This is what is known as the Pecking Order theory. 
For example, regarding firm size, although there was no reference to size in the original 
theory, recent studies emphasize differences between the optimal financial structure of 
small and large firms (e.g., Chittenden et al., 1996). Interestingly, it has been shown that 
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control aversion, preferences and other factors having implications for potential agency 
costs. (Pettit and Singer (1985), Cressy and Olofsson (1997a) and Jordan et al. (1998)). 
Empirical Studies on the Determinants of Capital Structure  
Capital structure theories suggest that the optimal debt ratio can be found given the 
tradeoff between benefits and costs of debt financing. They do not, however, explain why 
debt ratios observed across countries are different. That is, although capital structure 
theories provide some explanations for the variations of debt ratios across firms, which are 
observed, this does not necessarily constitute an explanation for the optimal debt-equity 
ratio or the extent of inoptimality. Many existing literature, therefore, have borrowed 
observed leverage as proxies for the optimal leverage ratio (Rajan et al. 1995; Titman et al. 
1988; Wedig et al. 1988, Harris and Raviv 1991). However, even if firms are aware of the 
inoptimality, they may not be able to adjust the debt ratio to an optimal level if the costs of 
adjustment are significantly high, making the adjustment too costly.  
Dynamic modeling has been recognized in a number of studies. Fischer, Heinkel, and 
Zechner (1989), for example, examine the features that determine the scope of deviations 
in a firms’ capital structures over time. Another example, Jalilvand and Harris (1984) 
characterize a firm’s financial behavior as partial adjustments to long run targets. The 
emphasis is on the interaction between different financial decisions of a firm and the long-
run financial targets, and they allow for variations in the speeds of adjustment by company 
and over time. The long-term targets toward which firms adjust are specified exogenously 
in their paper. Rajbhandary (1997) uses a similar dynamic adjustment model in the context 
of Indian firm data but with constant speed of adjustment, while Vilasuso and Minkler 
(2001) studied a dynamic model incorporating agency costs and asset specificity. Heshmati 
(2002) analyzed the dynamics of capital structure of Swedish micro and small firms, while 
Banerjee et al. (2004) analyzed the dynamics of capital structure of US and UK firms with 
a flexible adjustment parameter. Based on Korean non-financial listed companies for the 
period 1985 to 2002, this study estimates their optimal capital structure simultaneously 
treating the dynamics and flexible adjustment of capital structure. 
A review of empirical studies of capital structure and its determinants related to the Korean 
financial market is provided in the next section.  
 
3. THE KOREAN FINANCIAL MARKET  
Korean firms have been criticized for their high leverage. Moreover, large conglomerates 
or the chaebol
1 have commonly exhibited higher leverage than non-chaebol firms.
2 For 
                                                 
1 According to the definition by the Korean Fair Trade Commission (KFTC), a chaebol or business group 
refers to a group of companies that holds more than 30% of its shares owned by some particular individual or 
by companies governed by those individuals. Since 1987, the KFTC has identified and listed business groups 
each year.  
2 The average debt/equity ratio of firms exceeded 300%, approximately four times higher than that of Taiwan 
(IMF, 1998). For the 30 largest conglomerates, the ratio was over 500% and there were some large firms that 
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liability divided by the sum of total liability and equity for chaebol firms was 0.71 
compared to 0.63 for non-chaebol firms (standard deviations were 0.154 and 0.191, 
respectively). Such a difference in the debt ratios between chaebol and non-chaebol firms 
has been consistent over the different sub-periods that we studied (1985-1989, 1990-1996, 
1997-2002, and before and after the financial crisis. See Appendix A). Such firm-specific 
features of Korean companies have not been treated in corporate financing theory as 
important determinants of a firm’s capital structure, and, therefore, corporate finance 
theory alone seems insufficient in explaining the capital structure of Korean firms. 
Arguably, Korea-specific features, both institutional and structural ones, should be 
considered to better understand Korean financial markets, and to better model and interpret 
the results of empirical study more comprehensively. Thus, in this section, background 
information of the Korean financial market and the way it functions focusing on the 
reasons of high leverage of Korean firms is discussed. 
A major reason for the high leverage of Korean firms is attributed to the government’s 
interventionist development strategy, which has left a deep footprint on the development of 
financial markets and corporate governance in the economy. In the 1960s, the Korean 
government directly intervened in securing the necessary industrial capital for firms and 
this direct intervention has been instrumental in Korea’s economic development in the 
1960s and 70s. The government’s export promotion policy between 1962 and 1972, for 
example, followed by industrial promotion between 1973 and 1979, as well as the 
adjustment and deregulation between 1980 and 1993 are examples of the government-
managed economy (World Bank 1993). However, due to strong government intervention 
and protectionism since the 1960s, Korean firms in general and the chaebols in particular  
have transferred risks associated with their business to the public (Chang, 2003). Thus, 
firms had little incentive to lower their debt, thereby explaining their high debt to equity 
ratios especially before the infamous Asian crisis. Borensztein and Lee (1998) provide 
further discussion for Korea’s high-leverage economic structure, which they attribute 
largely to government intervention and its favoritism toward certain industries.  
Indeed, mainly domestic banks provide debt financing to firms, which was the case of 
Korea’s financial markets. Korean firms had the highest leverage and the highest growth of 
leverage ratios amongst East Asian firms in terms of the mean of the leverage ratios of 
listed firms during the period 1988 to 1996 (Claessens et al., 1998). Other studies treating 
the issue of corporate debt in Korea confirming this trend are Borensztein and Lee (1998), 
Lee (1998), Nam and Kim (1994) and Park (1997).  
Such high dependence on debt among Korean corporations was significantly reduced in 
the post-crisis period largely through the banking sector’s restructuring. Before the 
financial crisis, the Korean capital market was far short of global standards in terms of its 
efficiency, both operational and informational (Choi et al. 2000). In order to enhance the 
                                                                                                                                                    
in fact recorded debt/equity ratios of 3,000 percent (Lee et al., 2000). At the end of 1997, the total debt owed 
by Korean firms was approximately US$675 billion. This was almost 1.9 times the GDP in the same year 
(Nam et al., 1999). 
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comprehensive reforms addressing the rules and regulations, including the regulatory 
system itself and corporate governance, which combined together has contributed to the 
reduction in the debt to equity ratios of Korean firms after the crisis.  
Lee et al. (2000) has studied changes in the leverage and debt structure of Korean firms 
using an unbalanced panel from 1981 to 1997. They studied the financing decision of 
Korean firms and found that there were major differences in the capital structure choices 
between chaebol and non-chaebol firms after controlling for standard determinants 
proposed by corporate finance theory such as firm size, growth rates, tangible fixed assets 
and profitability. In their study, they divided their sample into three groups, the 1st-5
th 
largest chaebol firms, the 6-30
th largest chaebol firms and non-chaebol firms, and found 
that the five largest chaebol firms significantly increased leverage in terms of foreign 
financing. Other studies that treat the determinants of capital structure choices of Korean 
firms, but with cross sectional data or short-period panels, are Sunwoo (1990), Demirguc-
Kunt and Maksimovic (1994), Kim et al. (1997), Hahm, Ferri and Bongini (1998) and Wi 
(1998). 
Using industry-level panel data of 32 Korean manufacturing sectors and applying the 
random effects GLS method, Borensztein and Lee (1999) examined whether credit 
allocation was efficient in Korean manufacturing industries for the period 1969 to 1996. 
They investigated whether financial resources have been directed to more efficient sectors 
over this period. Their study shows that the profitability of investment did not play an 
important role in credit allocation but rather, given industrial characteristics and year 
dummies, the previous year’s profit rate turned out to have a negative effect on the current 
year’s flow of credit. This suggests the possibility that credit was allocated preferentially to 
sectors exhibiting worse economic performance. They did not find any evidence to support 
the proposition that credit was directed to relatively more profitable activities either before 
or after financial reforms. They also were not able to find evidence to support the 
proposition that the flow of credit, over time, contributed positively to improve the 
performance of favored industries.  
In sum, the literature has led us to believe that the capital structure of Korean firms, which 
is characterized by high leverage, is a reflection of Korean-specific factors such as 
government’s growth-oriented policy and government favoritism toward the chaebol. 
Inefficient management system for credit analysis of commercial banks, and firms’ lacking 
transparency in corporate governance structures also might belong to specific factors of 
Korean firms, which in turn affect the leverage ratio of firms. That is, the high leverage 
structure of Korean firms, which was a critical factor behind the financial crisis, cannot be 
explained solely by internal factors of firms or factors suggested by corporate finance 
theory. In addition to such factors, the government’s industrial and financial policy over 
Korea’s economic development history, the financial structure and firm characteristics also 
should be taken into account to better understand the capital structure of Korean firms.  
 
 
  74. THE DYNAMIC MODEL OF CAPITAL STRUCTURE 
Different approaches and different models have been used to study the capital structure of 
firms. For instance, Titman and Wessels (1988) used the LISREL system to model the 
capital structure of US manufacturing firms specified as:  ε ξ + Γ = y , where y is 
vector of debt ratios, Γ  is  1 × p m p×   matrix of factor loadings, ε  is   vector  of 
disturbance terms.  Fischer, Heinkel and Zechner (1989) derive the dynamic valuation 
equations of firm’s debt and equity securities for any given recapitalization policy, 
simultaneously solving for the firm’s optimal recapitalization policy and the equilibrium 
rate of return on the unleveraged assets. 
1 × p
This study uses tradition models of dynamics of capital structure studies. The main aim is 
to distinguish between observed and optimal leverage, with the latter allowed to vary 
across firms and over time. Let us first begin with the optimal leverage denoted by L  for 
firm   at time  , which will be a function of different variables.
*
it
i t  
(1)     ) , , (
*
t i it it X X X F L =
where  , represent the determinants of optimal leverage that are firm and time variant, 
 is a vector of observable, but constant over time, firm-specific variables, while   is a 
vector of time variant determinants that are constant across firms. In addition, dummy 
variables are included to capture the unobservable firm-specific and time-specific 
heterogeneity effects. 
it X
i X t X
Assuming ideal conditions, we safely state that at the equilibrium or at the long run, the 
observed leverage should be equal to the optimal leverage, i.e. L . If we try to 
expand this idea, we note the equality in changes in leverage from a previous period to the 
current as follows: 
*
it it L =
(2)     1
*
1 − − − = − it it it it L L L L
But since adjusting from one state to another is costly, in many cases, firms may find it 
easier and less expensive to adjust in the short-run. Thus, by introducing  it δ , an adjustment 
factor representing the magnitude of desired adjustment between two subsequent periods 
or the rate of convergence of L  to its optimal value L , we allow the firm to adjust 
partially for the different reasons stated in the previous section. Accordingly, (2) can be 




(3)     ) ( 1
*
1 − − − = − it it it it it L L L L δ
Three cases are possible: If (i)  1 = it δ , then the entire adjustment is made within one period 
and the firm’s observed leverage equals its optimal leverage, (ii)  1 < it δ , then the 
adjustment is insufficient and the new observed leverage will still be below the optimal, 
and (iii)  1 > it δ , then the firm is over adjusting, and the observed will be higher than the 
optimal, which is possible when firms borrow based on future investment projects but 
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downsize investment and demand for debt.   
We also intend to include a measure of the speed of adjustment, which could also be 
interpreted as the degree of adjustment per period, i.e.  it δ . Thus  it δ  is also a function of 
some variables affecting the adjustment cost, therefore by setting Z  as a vector of the 
determinants of speed of adjustment variables that are changing both over time and across 
firms, and including Z  and  , which are vectors of observable variable in one dimension 
but constant in another, we obtain the following: 
it
i t Z
(4)   () t i it it Z Z Z G , , = δ  
In addition, dummy variables are included to capture the unobservable firm-specific, time-
specific and other adjustment heterogeneity effects. 
Finally, by rearranging (3) and appending an error term ( ) it ε to it, we use the following 
equation for observed leverage: 
(5)      () it it it it it it L L L ε δ δ + + − = −
*
1 1
where, the optimal leverage is specified in terms of observables as: 
(6)      ∑∑ ∑ + + + =
js m
mt m si s jit j it X X X L α α α α0
*
and the speed of adjustment is also specified in terms of observables as: 
(7)   ∑∑ ∑ + + + =
js m
mt m si s jit j it Z Z Z β β β β δ 0  
A general feature of this type of adjustment model is that it does not take into account the 
target leverage beyond time t. It is assumed that future shifts in exogenous variables 
affecting future optimal leverage are unforeseeable. That is, changes in factors affecting 
the target leverage are unanticipated. In the absence of or in anticipation of major structural 
change, the current and past level of optimal leverage and estimated adjustment parameters 
contains useful information that can be used to predict the future behavior of leverage. 
As mentioned earlier, for the purpose of comparison, the following standard static model 
based on the following equation is included: 
(8)     ∑∑ ∑ + + + =
js m
mt m si s jit j it X X X L α α α α0
and by using estimated optimal leverage and observed leverage a measure of the degree of 
optimality of leverage is obtained from:  
(9)   .  it it L L /
*
The optimality ratio takes on a value of 1 if at time t the firm is at its optimal leverage. 
Since optimal leverage cannot be negative, the optimality ratio is restricted to being non-
negative. However, since the optimal leverage may shift over time, at any time a value of 1 
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leverage is firm-specific but time-invariant. 
The dynamics in (5) and its associated components consisting of equations (6) and (7) are 
jointly estimated. The model is non-linear in its parameters and an iterative non-linear 
estimation method is used,
3 while the static model (8) serving as a benchmark is linear and 
least squares is used. In both models unobservable firm-specific and time-specific effects 
are controlled for.  
 
5. THE DATA  
The data used in this paper is from KIS2003 (a corporate information database provided by 
the Korea Information Service). The database is based on the firms’ own financial accounts. 
After selecting listed non-financial companies for the period from 1985 to 2002,
4 our 
sample totaled 617 companies. An unbalanced panel with 9,604 observations was 
constructed. Table 1 presents summary statistics, while Table 2 shows the frequency 
distribution of firms by various characteristics. All monetary variables are expressed in 
fixed 2000 prices by dividing by manufacturing producer price index with the 2000 as the 
base year.
5  
The sample’s descriptive statistics show that the debt ratio for Korean firms, measured by 
total liability divided by sum of total liability and equity, has remained very high. For the 
entire period, 1985-2002, the debt ratio was on average 64.8%. During the period between 
1985 and 1989, the earlier period of our sample, the average debt ratio was 69%. It was 
66% between 1990 and 1996 and 60% for the after crisis period, 1997 to 2002. Comparing 
the debt ratio before and after the crisis, the debt ratio due to corporate restructuring has 
significantly lowered in the post-crisis period. Over time, the variability in the debt ratios 
across firms differs depending on the period, and after the crisis the variability due to 
differences in the impact of structural adjustment increased (see Appendix B for further 
details). 
 
6. MEASURES OF CAPITAL STRUCTURE AND ITS DETERMINANTS 
A typical concern in capital structure studies involves the question of whether to employ 
the book value of debt and equity, or the market value (or a combination of both). On the 
one hand, a firm’s choice concerning the optimal level of leverage is directly determined 
by the relative level of costs incurred vis-à-vis the level of benefits accruing from 
borrowing. By borrowing, the firm should benefit from tax savings since expenses are tax 
deductible, which will eventually have some positive effect on the firm’s value. However, 
                                                 
3 The procedure SYSNLIN in SAS is used to estimate the dynamic model. 
4 For a study of dynamics of capital structure of a large sample of Swedish micro and small firms see 
Heshmati (2002). 
5  Since we use ratio of variables, transformation of the variables to fixed prices is not necessary. For 
variables that are in levels or non-ratio form,  we transform them to fixed 2000 prices. 
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savings.  
Proponents favoring the use of book value argue that the main cost of borrowing is the 
expected cost of financial distress in the event of bankruptcy, and the relevant measure of 
debt holders’ liability is the book value of debt rather than the market value. On the other 
hand, those arguing in favor of market value to book value argue that the market value 
ultimately determines the real value of a firm. It should be noted that it is possible for a 
firm to have a negative book value of equity while simultaneously enjoying a positive 
market value, as a negative book value reflects previous losses, while a positive market 
value denotes the expected future cash flows of the firm. 
Due to data availability, we use only the book value of leverage, measured as the ratio of 
total liabilities to the sum of equity and total liabilities. In certain cases, when data 
availability allows, it is desirable that the total liability be divided into short and long-term 
liabilities. In this study, making such a distinction has been limited however, but this can 
be considered in future studies. 
A. Determinants of Optimal Leverage 
We now turn to describe explanatory variables recognized in the literature as possible 
determinants of firms’ capital structure that is also used in this study to explain variations 
in leverage. The expected effect of each factor on leverage based on the theory of capital 
structure
6 is also indicated in parenthesis:  
Income Variability (-): Variability of income is expected to be negatively related to 
leverage because the more volatile the income, the higher the probability of default on 
interest payment. For our purposes, the variance of operating income is used as a measure 
of income variability as operating income is subject to interest payment. The simple 
correlation matrix over the total sample period 1985-2002 showed that income variability 
was positively correlated with the debt ratio for Korean listed firms, and this positive 
correlation was consistent over the all sub-periods, namely, 1985-1989, 1990-1996, and 
1997-2002. 
Growth Opportunity (-): Firms with future growth prospects tend to rely more on equity 
finance (Rajan and Zingales, 1995). This can be explained by agency costs. If a firm is 
highly leveraged, then shareholders of firms tend not invest much in a firm’s project in the 
sense that returns to their investment will benefit mostly creditors rather than shareholders 
(Myers, 1997). Such agency costs may be significant, and if this is so, fast growing firms 
with highly profitable projects are more likely to depend more on equity rather than debt.
7 
Thus we may expect a negative relation between growth opportunity and leverage. As a 
measure of growth, the annual percentage change in total assets is used. The simple 
                                                 
6 For a summary of the expected effects by various theories of capital structure including agency costs, 
bankruptcy costs and asymmetric information see Heshmati (2002).  
7 However, such negative relationship is especially for long-term debts. According to Titman and Wessels 
(1998), it might be possible that short-term debt ratios are positively related to growth rates for the growing 
firms may substitute their short-term liabilities for long-term liabilities to reduce the agency cost. 
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that growth opportunity was negatively correlated with debt. 
Tangibility (+/-): This is measured as the ratio of tangible assets to total assets, and should 
be positively related to leverage, because firms with a high level of tangible assets would 
mean higher availability of collateral to raise debt. However, in Grossman and Hart (1982), 
it was shown that firm’s tangible (fixed) assets could be negatively correlated with firm’s 
leverage due to information asymmetry in firms with limited tangible assets and hence less 
collateralized debt would indicate more difficulty in monitoring employees. By increasing 
leverage, firms with limited tangible assets may receive help from creditors including 
financial intermediaries to monitor employees and therefore reduce the costs of 
information asymmetry. Using tangible fixed assets to total asset, Lee et al. (2000) found a 
negative relationship between tangible fixed assets and a firm’s leverage, and their results 
were robust throughout different model specifications. The simple correlation matrix 
shows that that tangibility over the total sample period 1985-2002 did not show a 
significant correlation with the debt ratio. This was also the case for the period 1990-1996. 
However, interestingly, for the period 1985-1989, negative correlation between tangibility 
and debt-ratio was found, followed by a positive correlation for the period 1997-2002.  
Size (+/-): According to Titman and Wesels (1988) firm size and the leverage are likely to 
be positively related especially in larger firms, as they typically have less direct bankruptcy 
costs and tend to diversify more, allowing themselves a higher optimal debt capacity. 
According to Chittenden (1996) larger firms use more leverage than small firms because of 
the relatively smaller costs of monitoring the firm, as well as reduced moral hazard and 
adverse selection problems. On the other hand, Rajan and Zingales (1995) state that less 
asymmetric information within larger firms leads to less incentive to raise debt, suggesting 
a negative relationship. The log of total assets is used as a measure of the firm’s size. The 
simple correlation matrix over the total sample period 1985-2002 show that size was 
positively correlated with the debt ratio for Korean listed firms, and this positive 
correlation was consistent over all three separate sub-periods.  
Profitability (+/-): Previous studies show different results regarding the relationship 
between leverage and profitability. For instance, Myers and Majluf (1984) state that since 
profitability is positively related to equity, it should be negatively related to leverage. 
Jensen (1986) states that profitable firms may signal quality by leveraging up, resulting in 
a positive relation between leverage and profitability. The measure used in this study is net 
income to total assets. The simple correlation matrix shows that, over the total sample 
period 1985-2002, profitability was negatively correlated with the debt ratio for Korean 
listed firms, and the results were consistent over all three separate sub-periods. 
Non-debt Tax Shield (-): Heshmati (2002) suggests that firms face incentives for 
borrowing, and take advantage of interest tax shields when they have enough taxable 
income to justify a debt issue. Thus, the presence of other non-debt tax shields is likely to 
reduce the optimal leverage. By using the ratio of depreciation to total assets, the firm’s 
use of tax shields other than interest tax shields can be accounted for. The simple 
correlation matrix shows a negative correlation between the non-debt tax shields and the 
debt ratio over the total sample period 1985-2002, and this was consistent with the two 
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found between non-debt tax shield and the debt ratio. 
Uniqueness (-): Uniqueness of a firm’s assets is measured by the cost of sales to net sales. 
Firms with unique products are expected to exhibit a lower leverage level because in the 
case of bankruptcy, a competitive secondary market for their inventory and production 
equipment does not exist. However, the simple correlation matrix shows a positive 
correlation of uniqueness with the debt-ratio over the total and this is consistent for all 
three separate sample sub-periods. 
Time Trend (+/-): This is included to capture any variation in leverage across time. Under 
normal conditions, leverage could either increase or decrease over time, and so should be 
studied on a case-by-case basis. But for the data set in this study, and since the period 
considered includes the financial crisis in 1997, the expected effect is found to have a 
negative relationship, i.e., leverage is expected to decrease especially after 1997. 
According to the simple correlation matrix, a negative correlation between trend and the 
debt-ratio over the total sample period was found, with the exception of the 1990-1996 
sub-period, which showed a positive correlation although weakly significant at only the 
9 % level. 
Financial Crisis (-): We may expect a negative relation between the 1997 financial crisis 
and firms’ leverage. In the post-crisis period, credit companies shifted towards tighter 
credit policy, making it more difficult and more costly for firms to raise debt. The crisis 
dummy was denoted 1 for years after 1997 and 0 to other years. 
Industrial Sector (+/-): To capture any systematic but unobservable industry heterogeneity 
effect that might have been overlooked by the variables listed above, industrial sector 
dummies are also included. All 617 companies are categorized into 24 industries. For 
further details, see the Appendix C. 
B. Determinants of the speed of adjustment. 
Since the speed of adjustment () it δ  is also a function of observable factors affecting the 
adjustment cost, what follows is a listing of these factors, some of which are partially 
overlapping with the factors determining the optimal debt level, and a specification of the 
expected relation between them and the speed of adjustment. It should be noted that the 
costs of shifting from the observed to the optimal leverage is the focus here, rather than the 
direct costs associated with leverage levels. 
Distance (+): If fixed costs are an important segment of the total costs of adjusting the  
capital structure, firms with lower than optimal leverage would change their capital 
structure only if they are sufficiently far away from the optimal capital structure. The 
likelihood of adjustment is a positive function of the difference between optimal and 
observed leverage. In this model, the absolute value of the gap  1
*
− − it it L L  is incorporated 
as a determinant. 
Current Liabilities (+): Firms with a high level of short-term liabilities compared to long-
term liabilities possess ability to adjust to a new level of leverage easier and faster than 
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long term, can be easily raised or paid-off, depending on whether the firm is below the 
optimal leverage or above it. The ratio of current liabilities to total liabilities is used as a 
measure of current liabilities. 
Intangible Assets (-): Credit companies are more willing to lend money if they can secure 
collateral against it, and collateral is measured by the degree of tangible assets that a firm 
owns. Since the speed of adjustment is positively related to tangible assets it should be 
negatively related to intangible assets. Thus, the higher the degree of intangible assets the 
slower is the speed of adjustment. The log of intangible assets is used as a measure for this 
variable. 
Investment (+): Investment is seen as a sign of potential growth and strength after taking 
into consideration the risk related to each investment. Thus firms with a high degree of 
investment are expected to raise debt easier than their counterparts. The log of investment 
is used for estimation. 
Time Trend (-): Whether the speed of adjustment varies over time can be an interesting 
issue, considering especially the impact of the Asian financial crisis. A negative relation 
between trend and the speed of adjustment is expected, since we can expect that credit 
firms have preferred tighter credit policy after the crisis, which is reflected in the trend 
variable.    
Financial Crisis (-): The crisis variable is included because we can expect a direct and clear 
effect on both, optimal leverage and the speed of adjustment. After the crisis, the speed of 
adjustment is expected to slow down somewhat, because raising debt is expected to 
become more difficult. 
Shareholding (+/-): Shareholder dummies are also included to capture the effect of 
different shareholders (ownership structure) on decisions on capital structure and hence the 
speed of adjustment. 6 dummy variables are included regarding the corporate governance 
structure, indicating shares held by government, by corporation, by foreign shareholders, 
by individuals, by minor shareholders and my major shareholders, respectively. 
 
7. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
The dynamic and static capital structure models were estimated using non-linear and linear 
least square estimation, respectively. The reason for including a standard static model in 
addition to the dynamic one is to make comparisons between both, and to verify whether 
the dynamic model offers a better explanation than the traditional static one. The two 
models are not nested and as such not directly comparable, yet the static model can serve 
as a benchmark.  
To compare the two models, the respective root mean squares error (RMSE) and 
coefficient of determination (R
2) values of the two models are examined (see Table 3 for 
results). The dynamic model had a RMSE of 0.0809 and R
2 of 0.8138 compared to a 
RMSE of 0.1684 and a R
2 of 0.1936 for the static model. Thus, without considering some 
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2 of the dynamic model with lag 
dependent variables is, as expected, a better fit for modelling the capital structure, which 
provides us a better understanding of the variation in the capital structures of Korean firms. 
By including the flexible speed of adjustment parameter, we allow the dynamic model to 
contain more explanatory power than the traditional static one, since it offers a more 
complete representation of leverage behaviour.  
A closer examination of the restricted traditional dynamic model, where the speed of 
adjustment consists only of a constant term (Rajbhandary, 1997; Vilasuso and Minkler, 
2001) shows that the increase in explanatory power of the model (RMSE of 0.0878 and a 
lower R
2 of 0.7811 compared to a RMSE of 0.1684 and a R
2 0.1936 for the static model) 
was due largely to the introduction of a lagged-dependent variable, whose coefficient is the 
constant in the adjustment equation (namely β0.)  
The summary statistics reported in Table 1 shows that Korean manufacturing companies 
have relatively high levels of leverage. The sample mean and standard deviations are 
64.8% and 18.7%. It has been shown that listed U.S. firms are in the 25% to 33% range, 
while those in the U.K. range from 10% to 16% (Rajan & Zingales, 1995). Furthermore, 
Table 4 shows the mean values by crisis period, by which we can easily confirm the 
difference in indebtedness of Korean manufacturing firms for the periods before and after 
the 1997 financial crisis.  
For instance, in Table 4 it is shown that the mean adjustment parameter δ  before 1997 
was 18%, while after 1997, it decreased to 14.9%; the mean optimal debt recorded was 
65.2% before the crisis compared to 39.7% in the post-crisis period. The observed mean 
debt dropped from 67.6% to 58.3% and the mean distance declined from -2.4% to -18.6%, 
which is consistent with the mean optimality ratio that also dropped from 96.5% to 68.1%. 
The 1997 economic crisis had an enormous impact on Korea’s financial markets, when 
macroeconomic fundamentals were good but the banking sector became a burdened over-
ridden with non-performing short term loans. The proportion of collateralized loans of 
Korean banks was very low before the crisis. For example, the collateralized loans of 25 
commercial banks were only 32% of overall loans as at the end of 1996, equivalent of 68 
trillion won, compared to the proportion of collateralized loans in 1990 and 1995 at 42.2 
and 37.6%, respectively (Kataoka, 2000) and Takahashi, 1998). Evidently, bank lending 
practices were not based on proper credit risk analysis, and such a trend was more 
significant especially right before the crisis. Korean banks expanded non-collateral based 
loans on firms, especially for chaebols. However, as we have already mentioned, there was 
significant reduction in the firms’ leverage and, correspondingly, bank lending since. The 
financial crisis forced banks to implement radical and painful changes in order to improve 
competitiveness and efficiency. The banking sector has also undergone restructuring and 
has been forced to abandon practices that encourage moral hazard. Banks have had to 
adopt an advanced management system including proper credit analysis, die example 
(Kataoka, 2000).  
We now turn to a detailed analysis of the empirical results from the dynamic flexible 
adjustment model and investigate whether the conventional corporate finance theory 
describes well the financing behavior of listed Korean companies. We empirically 
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for the entire period, 1985-2002, and also for the sub-periods, 1985-1989, 1990-1996, and 
1997-2002, to see whether results differed by different time periods.
8  
A. Determinants of Optimal Leverage. 
Dispersion in revenue measured as income variability was found to be statistically 
insignificant. The variability of income was expected to be negatively related to leverage, 
according to the theory, implying that the more volatile the income, the higher the 
probability of default. However, the insignificance of the coefficient was robust over all 
three models. Income variability did not appear to be a significant factor determining the 
level of leverage of Korean firms. This suggests that, for credit providers in the Korean 
financial market, income-based criterion was not a major rationing criterion. 
Based on the theory of corporate finance growth measured as growth opportunity, a 
negative relationship with leverage is expected (Stulz, 1990). Ranjan and Zingales (1995) 
argued that the under-investment problem might cause firms with high-expected future 
growth to mainly use equity financing. Growth opportunity showed a negative sign in the 
static model (-0.0013) and in the restricted dynamic model (-0.0024), but a positive 
relationship in the unrestricted dynamic capital structure model (0.0022) with all cases 
having highly statistically significant results. Even for the static model, the negative sign 
seemed to be associated with the period after the crisis, as it was positive 0.0007 and 
0.0004 for the first two periods 1985-1989 and 1990-1996, respectively.  
The results for tangibility show a difference in signs as well as magnitudes between the 
static and dynamic models. On the one hand, the estimated parameter of the static model 
was not statistically significant, while the unrestricted dynamic model showed a negative 
effect (-0.2150), which is consistent with Grossman and Hart (1982). The same applies to 
the restricted dynamic model which showed a negative relationship, but at a lower 10% 
level of significance. The results from the static model by sub-periods were also examined, 
and results suggest that the relationship between tangibility and the debt ratio was negative 
and highly significant during the periods 1985-1989 and 1990-1996. A positive sign 
appeared only in the period after the crisis, 1997-2002. Thus, the positive sign in the static 
model over the entire sample period 1985-2002 must be a result of the significant and 
positive effect in the post-crisis period, which would have dominated the negative effect in 
the pre-crisis period. Specifically for the period after the crisis, the empirical result 
suggests that banks or credit providers became more careful in lending, often requiring 
sufficient collateral. 
Our empirical estimation showed a positive and statistically significant relation between 
size, measured by log of total assets, and leverage in all of the three models (static, 
restricted and unrestricted dynamic models). This can be interpreted as due to the fact that 
larger firms have better ability to raise more debt than smaller firms and are less vulnerable 
to bankruptcy. 
                                                 
8 In order to conserve space, not all results from the sub-periods are reported here. However, these are 
available from the authors upon request. 
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showed a negative relationship with leverage, and is consistent with Myers (1984) and 
Michaels et al., (1999). The coefficient were negative and highly significant at the 1% 
level of significance with values -0.0465, -0.3395 and -2.2197 for the static, restricted and 
unrestricted dynamic models, respectively. As already mentioned, for a profitable firm, the 
target debt to equity ratio is typically low, because such firms would prefer to rely on 
internal financing before seeking external loans, i.e. the pecking order theory (Myers, 
1984).  
The coefficient of non-debt tax shields is negative and significant for the static model (-
0.0329) and positive for the unrestricted dynamic model (0.0902). If the positive sign for 
the dynamic model is in fact correct, then Korean listed firms do not make much use of 
other tax shields that do not involve the issuance of debt, for instance depreciation. That is, 
the main tax shield seems to be generated from deducting interest expense. 
Firms with product uniqueness, due to sunk costs in production technology, are expected to 
exhibit lower leverage since, in the case of bankruptcy, a competitive secondary market for 
their inventory and production equipment would not exist. The static and the restricted 
models showed positive and significant coefficients (0.0529 and 0.1655), while the 
dynamic model showed a negative sign, but was statistically insignificant. Even the 
positive sign in the static model can be interpreted as being a result of the dominant crisis 
effect compared with the period before the crisis, which showed insignificant relationship 
between uniqueness and the debt ratio.  
The time trend variable, which is expected to be negatively correlated with the leverage 
mainly because of the adverse effects of the financial crisis on the credit market, was found 
to be highly significant and negatively correlated with leverage (-0.0081) in the static 
model, whereas, in the unrestricted dynamic model the negative association was 
statistically insignificant.  
For both static and dynamic models, the coefficient for financial crisis turned out to be 
highly significant and negatively related to leverage, which was expected, since the 
financial crisis had a debt tightening effect on financial markets in Korea. Before the crisis, 
it was easier to raise debt than after the crisis when banks adopted tighter credit policy.  
Most of the industrial sector dummy coefficients were found to be statistically insignificant, 
especially in the unrestricted dynamic model. The lack of industry heterogeneity is 
evidence of the homogenous impact of the crisis on firms across different sectors of the 
economy. Before the financial crisis, due to the expansionist growth policy and the 
common within chaebol group cross-debt guarantees, most Korean business group 
affiliates were highly indebted.  
B. Determinants of the Speed of Adjustment. 
In reality, firms have different capital structure and face different capital market conditions. 
This leads to different speeds of adjustment towards their firm-specific optimal capital 
structures. Differences in adjustment speeds are accounted for by including the 
determinants of the speed of adjustment, which are captured by the dynamic model. In the 
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coefficient is equal to 1, i.e. there is no difference between the observed and the optimal 
leverage ratios.  
Table 3 panel B shows that some of the measured variables are significant while others are 
not. For instance the share of current liabilities variable is positively significant (0.0677) 
showing that firms with a high level of short-term debt adjust faster than their counterparts, 
which is an obvious result as current liabilities are highly liquid and could be relieved 
easily. Our empirical findings also show that firms with a higher degree of foreign 
investment adjust rapidly towards their optimal level of capital structure suggesting that 
foreign investors could have access to a broader set of credit sources, (the parameter 
estimated was 0.0022). Moreover, the investment variable was also found to be positive 
and significant (0.0123), illustrating the fact that firms with a high level of investment 
could adjust more easily than firms with lower levels. This implies that investment is seen 
by creditors as a sign of strength, profitability and growth, and are therefore willing to lend 
more to high investment firms than low investment ones.  
The crisis and trend variables were both found to be negatively related to the speed of 
adjustment, which asserts our expectations that with time, and especially after the crisis, 
the financial environment in Korea became tighter making the act of borrowing more 
demanding, thereby leading to a wider gap between the observed and the optimal leverage, 
and, consequently, slowing down the speed of adjustment. As suggested earlier, in Section 
6, a distance variable representing the absolute difference between optimal and observed 
leverages was included. If the coefficient is positive, this indicates a positive association 
between the gap of optimal and observed leverage as well as the speed at which a firm 
might fill the gap in optimality. This suggests the presence of fixed adjustment costs and 
an inverted U-shaped overall adjustment cost. However, the coefficient was found to be 
statistically insignificant. 
C. Variations in the Results 
Table 4 shows the mean values of the speed of adjustment, optimal leverage, observed 
leverage, distance between the observed and the optimal leverage, and the ratio of 
optimality, by year of observation, crisis period, industry aggregate, size of companies and 
membership to the chaebol affiliation. The variable total asset is used to classify firms by 
group size. 
It is clearly noticeable from panel B that the effect of the crisis on the speed of adjustment, 
δ , after the mean which dropped from about 18.0% before the crisis to a 14.9% in the 
post-crisis period, indicating that raising debt in the post-1997 period became more 
difficult and may have become more costly. This is backed up by the fact that the optimal 
and observed ratios decreased comparing both periods. Moreover, one of the effects of the 
crisis has been to increase the distance between the observed and the optimal, with the 
mean dropping from -2.4% to -18.6%.  
The results shown in Panel A, by year of observation, also lead to the same conclusion as 
those in the post-crisis period. Before 1997, the mean of the speed of adjustment fluctuated 
between a maximum of 18.8% and a minimum of 17.2%, while after 1997, the mean 
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of adjustment decreased over time, although there were some fluctuations during this 
period, but increased after 1994 until 1997. After the crisis, there was a significant 
decrease in the mean speed of adjustment indicating that firms had faced financial 
difficulties. The mean of adjustment speed remained low (approximately 14.9%), more or 
less constantly in the post-crisis period.  
Restructuring in the banking sector in the aftermath of the Asian crisis pushed for more 
efficient and transparent credit analysis systems, and has been judged to be an effective 
measure. Interestingly, the distance between optimal and observed leverage, which was 
negative until 1993 (with the gap becoming narrower) turned positive in 1994 and increase 
up until 1997. The shift from a negative to positive distance implies that since 1994, firms’ 
optimal leverage exceeded observed leverage, meaning that firms were less dependent on 
debt financing. After the crisis, the distance became negative again in 1998. Since 1998, 
the distance increased but remained negative until 2002. This is mainly because, although 
the observed leverage declined after the crisis implying that the firms tend to depend less 
on debt-financing or it became more difficult to borrow, the optimal level of leverage 
dropped more significantly that the observed level. 
Regarding the change in the observed and optimal leverage, before the crisis, the optimal 
leverage, overall, increased over time while the observed leverage, overall, decreased for a 
while and remained quite constant after the crisis. The observed pattern of firms’ actual 
financing behaviour, therefore, is not necessarily consistent with the change in optimal 
level of leverage mainly due to adjustment costs that a firm could be facing. The optimality, 
the ratio between optimal and observed leverage, provides us similar interpretation as the 
distance between them. 
Panel D, which shows the mean by firm size, reflects the fact that the speed of adjustment 
increases as firm size increases, mainly because larger firms find it easier and relatively 
cheaper to adjust than smaller firms. 
Panel E of Table 4 shows that the mean speed of adjustment for chaebol firms was 0.202 
over the sample period, which was higher than that for non-chaebol firms that recorded 
0.163, indicating the possibility that chaebol firms had better access to debt financing as a 
result of cross-subsidiary loan guarantees and/or mutual investments. Chaebol firms were 
also associated with higher optimal level of leverage as well as observed leverage 
compared to non-chaebol firms, and also the optimality ratio was higher (the distance was 
smaller) for chaebol firms compared to their non-chaebol counterparts. 
The industry aggregate panel does not show any significant difference between the 
different industries, because the level of debt financing and the speed of adjustment do not 
differ by industry type. This indicates similarities in the financial market and in credit 
policy conditions that firms face, and the strong and homogeneous impact of the crisis on 
the capital market and bank-firm relationship.  
Table 5 reports the correlation coefficients between optimal, observed and their distance 
and optimality ratio of leverage, size, speed of adjustment and time. The optimal, observed, 
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distance and firm size are positively related to time. 
The correlation coefficient between optimal and observed leverages is somewhat low at 
0.55. The distance or gap from optimality was found to be negatively related to size and 
group membership, indicating that external sources of investment was to a higher degree 
accessible to larger firms, in particular those with chaebol affiliation. Chaebol firms are 
closer to their optimal level and tend to adjust their capital structure much faster.   
 
8. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
This paper examined factors that influence the capital structure decision for Korean listed 
manufacturing companies. The aim of this paper was to provide deeper insight regarding 
the Korean firms’ leverage behavior, which has attracted considerable interest, as the high 
debt ratios were singled out as a major cause of the 1997 financial crisis. To trace capital 
structure adjustments over time, a dynamic model has been adopted in this study. The 
results from the dynamic model are compared to the conventional static model, which is 
used to identify systematic differences. 
The Asian financial crisis had very clear effects on the Asian financial markets in general, 
and the Korean market in particular, which was confirmed in all estimate models in this 
study. Results include the fact that the speed of adjustment decreased and the optimal 
leverage also decreased by a larger degree compared to the observed leverage in the post-
crisis period, which led to an increase in the distance between both measures and a fall in 
the optimality ratio. It also likely that, Korean non-financial firms after the outbreak of 
crisis have become more risk averse, and have begun to favor internal financing over debt 
financing, especially for growing and profitable firms. This is confirmed by the negative 
relation between growth opportunity and profitability on the one hand, and leverage, on the 
other.  
The restructuring agreement between the IMF and the Korean government, under Articles 
32 and 37 stipulated that (i) firms should increase the ceiling on individual foreign 
ownership from 7 to 50% by the end of 1997, (ii) government should not interfere with 
banks’ business operations and lending decisions, (iii) bankruptcy procedures should be 
improved and any subsidies to bail out individual companies eliminated, and (iv) debt 
levels of Korean companies reduced and changes made regarding the system of mutual 
guarantees within conglomerates to reduce the risks that these guarantees entail. All these 
measures are basically aimed at lowering the debt ratio and to encourage firms’ reliance on 
external sources of capital. The improved financial stability and recovery of the economy 
together with improved domestic financial sources will hopefully help Korea on its path 
towards becoming an advanced industrialized nation; a nation strong enough to avoid 
exposure to future undesirable external shocks in the domestic financial market. 
This study has examined whether Korean unique factors such as chaebol-affiliation 
influenced the optimal level of leverage, as well as the speed of adjustment, to better 
understand specific characteristics of the Korean financial market that might help explain 
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affiliated firms adjust more likely to the optimal leverage once they have drifted away from 
the optimal levels, but being a chaebol-affiliated firm is not a causal factor determining the 
optimal level of leverage. This finding differs from several other studies. Regarding the 
chaebol effect, one may make judgment that chaebol firms are more likely to have high 
debt ratio than non-chaebol firms. For example, Lee et al. (2000) argued that the chaebol-
affiliation dummies, which are designed to test whether chaebol firms have significantly 
higher leverage than non-cheabol firms, appear significantly positive, and that this 
empirical finding is supported by the observation that the chaebol-affiliated firms have 
higher debt/asset ratios than non-chaebol firms. Based on their finding, they asserted that 
chaebol firms have more leverage than their non-chaebol competitors, even after 
controlling for other determinants of the firms’ capital structure.  
The empirical finding of this paper, however, indicates that such a gap is not caused by a 
pure chaebol effect. Rather, chaebol firms’s leverage associated with other factors such as 
size, profitability and growth opportunity, which influence the optimal leverage positively. 
Our empirical findings showed that the coefficient for chaebol in the static model when 
significant was negative and insignificant in the dynamic unrestricted model. Chaebol-
affiliated firms are positively associated with higher debt not because they are chaebol 
affiliated, but because they are larger in size, more profitable, and/or have more unique 
products. In general, it is rather difficult to isolate the chaebol effect effectively, as it might 
appear in other characteristics, as well as the industrial sector and time effects. In earlier 
studies such as Lee at al. (2000), the positive coefficient was not always statistically 
significant and was dependent on the model specification or period through which the 
study was conducted, indicating that such positive and significant coefficient (mostly 5% 
level in the case the coefficient showed significance) may appear as a result of omissions 
of variable determining the optimal leverage such as uniqueness and non-debt tax shields. 
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  24Table 1. Summary Statistics of the Data, 9604 observation. 
Variable   Definition   Mean   Std. Dev   Minimum   Maximum 
A. Determinants of Capital Structure: 
Crisis   1997 Financial crisis   0.299   0.458   0.000   1.000 
Size log(total  assets)  18.506  1.515  13.615  24.890 
Deratio  Leverage  0.648 0.187 0.043 1.000 
Grow Growth  Opportunity  9.459  24.657  -541.523  97.518 
Tang  Tangibility  0.350 0.175 0.003 0.973 
Prof Profitability  0.014  0.350  -6.273  28.531 
Ndts  Non-Debt Tax Shield  0.196  0.169  0.000  3.141 
Uniq  Uniqueness  0.810 0.194 0.000 9.303 
Vari Income  Variability  14.899  138.220  0.000  2415.791 
Chaebol Chaebol  Affiliation  0.187 0.390 0.000 1.000 
B. Determinants of the Speed of Adjustment: 
Lintan Log(Intangible  Assets)  8.501 5.371 0.000  21.941 
Linve Log(Investment)  16.323 1.819 7.212  22.857 
Scurliabil Current  Liabilities  0.637 0.183 0.025 1.000 
Shgovern Shareholder,  Government  0.218 3.081 0.000  77.800 
Shallcorp Shareholder,  Corporation 25.465  22.655  0.000  122.800 
Shforeig Shareholder,  Foreigner  3.700 9.002 0.000  100.000 
Shindivi Shareholder,  Individual 51.310  32.890  0.000  100.000 
Shminor Shareholder,  Minor 42.410  26.791  0.000  100.000 
Shmajor Shareholder,  Major 22.853  18.420  0.000  100.000 






  25Table 2.The frequency distribution of firms, observations.. 
        Cumulative    Cumulative 
Characteristics  Definition   Frequency   Percent   Frequency   Percentage 
A. Frequency by year of observation: 
1986      515   5.36   515   5.36 
1987   537  5.59  1052  10.95 
1988   551  5.74  1603  16.69 
1989   558  5.81  2161  22.50 
1990   563  5.86  2724  28.36 
1991   568  5.91  3292  34.28 
1992   571  5.95  3863  40.22 
1993   569  5.92  4432  46.15 
1994   573  5.97  5005  52.11 
1995   575  5.99  5580  58.10 
1996   575  5.99  6155  64.09 
1997   575  5.99  6730  70.07 
1998   574  5.98  7304  76.05 
1999   575  5.99  7879  82.04 
2000   575  5.99  8454  88.03 
2001   575  5.99  9029  94.01 
2002   575  5.99  9604  100.00 
B. Frequency by Industry Sector: (based on International Code Standardization): 
Ind.1  Fishing and Mining  119  1.24  119  1.24 
Ind.2  Manufactor of Food Products and Beverage  644  6.71  763  7.94 
Ind.3  Man. of Tobacco Products  9  0.09  772  8.04 
Ind.4  Man. of Textiles, Except Sewn Wearing  355  3.70  1127  11.73 
Ind.5  Man. of Sewn Wearing Apparel  315  3.28  1442  15.01 
Ind.6  Man. of Luggage and Footwear  98  1.02  1540  16.03 
Ind. 7  Man. of Wood  51  0.53  1591  16.57 
Ind.8  Man. of Paper and Paper Products  355  3.70  1946  20.26 
Ind.9  Publishing and Printing Recorded Media  33  0.34  1979  20.61 
Ind.10  Man. of Coke, Refined Petroleum Products  84  0.87  2063  21.48 
Ind.11  Man. of Chemicals and Chemical Products  1584  16.49  3647  37.97 
Ind.12  Man. of Rubber and Plastic Production  230  2.39  3877  40.37 
Ind.13  Man. of Other Non-metallic Mineral Products  390  4.06  4267  44.43 
Ind.14  Man. of Basic Metals  626  6.52  4893  50.95 
Ind.15  Man. of Fabricated Metal Products  183  1.91  5076  52.85 
Ind.16  Man. of Other Machinery and Equipment  449  4.68  5525  57.53 
Ind.17  Man. of Computers and Office Machinery  100  1.04  5625  58.57 
Ind.18  Man. of Electrical Machinery and Furniture  336  3.50  5961  62.07 
Ind.19  Man. of Electronics, Radio, Television  810  8.43  6771  70.50 
Ind.20  Man. of Medical Instruments  114  1.19  6885  71.69 
Ind.21  Man. of Motor Vehicles and Trailers  545  5.67  7430  77.36 
Ind.22  Man. of Other Transport Equipment  85  0.89  7515  78.25 
Ind.23 Man.  of  Furniture  102  1.06  7617  79.31 
Ind.24  Refer to Appendix C  1987  20.69  9604  100.00 
C. Frequency by size of sales: 
Very small  (tot assets <27.000000 won)  1596  16.62  1596  16.62 
Small (27.000000-60.000000  won)  1962  20.43  3558  37.05 
Medium (60.000000-125.000000  won)  1966  20.47  5524  57.52 
Large (125.000000-300.000000  won)  1968  20.49  7492  78.01 




  26  Table 3. Static and dynamic model parameter estimates, NT=9604 observations. Dependent variable is the ratio: total liability/(equity+total liability).  
Model   Static Model    Restricted Dynamic  Unrestricted Dynamic 
Variable Definition    Estimate    Std  Err  Estimate   Std Err   Estimate   Std Err   
A. Determinants of capital structure: 
Intercept   Intercept   0.3970a   0.0326   -0.0814   0.1224   0.0864   0.0894 
Variability   Inc. variability   -0.0000b   0.0000   -0.0001   0.00005   -0.00005   0.00003 
Growth Growth  -0.0013a 0.0001 -0.0024a 0.0003  0.0022a 0.0003 
Tangibility Tangibility  0.0002   0.0112  -0.0775c  0.0415  -0.2150a  0.0320 
Size Size  0.0171a 0.0016  0.0359a 0.0059  0.0366a 0.0043 
Profitability Profitability  -0.0465a 0.0051 -0.3395a 0.0230  -2.2197a 0.0805 
Non-debt tax shield  Non-debt tax shield  -0.0329a 0.0116  -0.0479 0.0428  0.0902a 0.0320 
Uniqueness Uniqueness  0.0529a 0.0010  0.1655a 0.0372  -0.0369 0.0348 
Trend Trend  -0.0081a 0.0006  0.0066a 0.0024  -0.0004 0.0017 
Crisis Crisis  -0.0654a 0.0063 -0.4233a 0.0282  -0.3019a 0.0193 
Chaebol Chaebol  0.0351a 0.0053  0.0263 0.0196  0.0343a 0.0132 
Ind.2 Man.  Food Products and Beverage  0.0614a 0.0170  0.0306 0.0628  0.0700c 0.0423 
Ind.3  Manufactor of Tobacco Products  -0.3951a 0.0585  -0.1341 0.2165  -0.0890 0.1340 
Ind.4  Man. of Textiles, Except Sewn Wearing  -0.0170 0.0179  -0.0492 0.0663  -0.0600 0.0459 
Ind.5  Man. of Sewn Wearing Apparel  -0.0128 0.0185  -0.0370 0.0683 0.0021 0.0469 
Ind.6  Man. of Luggage and Footwear  0.0471a 0.0232  -0.0131 0.0859 0.0217 0.0671 
Ind.7  Man. of Wood  -0.0169 0.0283  -0.0874 0.1048  -0.0486 0.0700 
Ind.8  Man. of Paper and Paper Products  0.0373b 0.0184  -0.0147 0.0667 0.0413 0.0466 
Ind.9  Publishing and Printing Recorded Media  0.0171 0.0337  0.0249 0.1245  -0.1006 0.0859 
Ind.10  Man. of Coke, Refined Petroleum Products  -0.0746a 0.0242  -0.1365 0.0895  -0.0046 0.0547 
Ind.11  Man. of Chemicals and Chemical Products  -0.0337b 0.0163  -0.0493 0.0602  -0.0189 0.0410 
Ind.12  Man. of Rubber and Plastic Production  -0.0546a 0.0191  -0.1158 0.0708  -0.0260 0.0479 
Ind.13  Man. of Other Non-metallic Mineral Products  -0.0013 0.0178  -0.0351 0.0658 0.0275 0.0442 
Ind.14  Man. of Basic Metals  -0.0367b 0.0170  -0.0977 0.0629  -0.0482 0.0426 
Ind.15  Man. of Fabricated Metal Products  0.0513b 0.0200  0.0162 0.0740  -0.0146 0.0542 
Ind.16  Man. of Other Machinery and Equipment  -0.0101 0.0176  -0.0603 0.0651  -0.0284 0.0455 
Ind.17  Man. of Computers and Office Machinery  -0.0549b 0.0230  -0.0799 0.0851  -0.0822 0.0616 
Ind.18  Man. of Electrical Machinery and Furniture  -0.0317c 0.0182  -0.0981 0.0673  -0.0378 0.0462 
Ind.19  Man. of Electronics, Radio, Television  -0.0166 0.0167  -0.0313 0.0616  -0.0438 0.0423 
Ind.20  Man. of Medical Instruments   -0.0446b 0.0223  -0.0221 0.0824  -0.0813 0.0621 
Ind.21  Man. of Motor Vehicles and Trailers  0.0310c 0.0172  0.0375 0.0635 0.0471 0.0433 
Ind.22  Man. of Other Transport Equipment  0.0296 0.0243  0.0131 0.0898  -0.0087 0.0588 
Ind.23  Man. of Furniture  0.0743a 0.0229  0.0331 0.0847 0.0162 0.0582 
Ind.24  Refer to Appendix C  0.0538a 0.0162  0.0203 0.0599 0.0403 0.0408 Table 3. Continued.  
Model   Static Model    Restricted Dynamic  Unrestricted Dynamic 
Variable Definition    Estimate    Std  Err  Estimate   Std Err   Estimate   Std Err   
B. Determinants of speed of adjustment: 
Intercept   Intercept   ….   ….   0.1409a   0.0054   -0.0470b   0.0216 
Distance Distance  ….  …. ….  ….  0.0000  0.0060 
Current Liabilities  Current Liabilities ….  ….  …. ….  0.0677a  0.0067 
Intangible Assets  Intangible Assets  …. ….  …. ….  0.0029a  0.0004 
Government Sh.  Shareholder, Government  …. ….  …. ….  -0.0029b  0.0013 
Total Sh.  Shareholder, Total  …. ….  …. ….  0.0001  0.0001 
Foreigner Sh.  Shareholder, Foreigner  …. ….  …. ….  0.0022a  0.0003 
Individual Sh.  Shareholder, Individual  …. ….  …. ….  -0.0001  0.0001 
Minor Sh.  Shareholder, Minor  …. ….  …. ….  -0.0011a  0.0001 
Crisis Crisis  ….  …. ….  ….  -0.0233a  0.0090 
Trend  Trend  …. ….  …. ….  -0.0050a  0.0011 
Investment Investment  …. ….  …. ….  0.0123a  0.0014 
Major Sh.  Shareholder, Major  ….  ….  ….  ….  0.0020a  0.0002 
 
Adj R
2  Adjusted R
2  0.1908   0.7803   0.8129  
RMSE  Root Mean Square Error  0.1684    0.0878    0.0809 





















  28Table 4. Mean values from unrestricted dynamic model, 9604 observations. 
Year   Definition   delta   optimal   observed    distance    mills ratio 
Panel A. Mean by year of observation: 
1986          0.188        0.601    0.736    -0.135     0.817 
1987          0.183        0.589         0.722        -0.133        0.816 
1988          0.184  0.591  0.680  -0.089  0.869 
1989          0.183  0.625  0.639  -0.014  0.979 
1990          0.187  0.642  0.647   -0.006  0.991 
1991          0.181  0.649  0.664  -0.015  0.977 
1992          0.179  0.656  0.668  -0.012  0.982 
1993          0.174  0.661  0.665    -0.004  0.995 
1994          0.172  0.674  0.668  0.006  1.010 
1995          0.174  0.677  0.666  0.011  1.017 
1996          0.175  0.704  0.666  0.038  1.056 
1997          0.177  0.740   0.692   0.048  1.070 
1998          0.148  0.457  0.653   -0.196  0.700 
1999          0.148  0.404   0.600    -0.195  0.674 
2000          0.148  0.391     0.589       -0.197   0.665 
2001          0.151   0.383       0.555    -0.172       0.690 
2002          0.152  0.351      0.522    -0.171    0.672 
Panel B. Mean by crisis period: 
1985-1997             0.180  0.652   0.676      -0.024        0.965 
1998-2002             0.149   0.397       0.583    -0.186      0.681 
Panel C. Sample mean and standard deviations by industrial sector: 
Ind.1            Fishing and Mining   0.189  0.597   0.645  -0.048  0.925 
Ind.2             Man. Food Products and Beverage  0.188  0.655  0.706  -0.051  0.928 
Ind.3    Man. of Tobacco Products  0.212  0.403  0.262  0.140  1.535 
Ind.4    Man. of Textiles, Except Sewn Wearing  0.164  0.511  0.624  -0.113  0.819 
Ind.5             Man. of Sewn Wearing Apparel  0.176  0.530  0.613   -0.083   0.864 
Ind.6             Man. of Luggage and Footwear  0.144  0.592   0.685    -0.093  0.864 
Ind.7             Man. of Wood  0.188  0.514         0.630        -0.116        0.816 
Ind.8             Man. of Paper and Paper Products  0.159  0.586         0.672        -0.087  0.871 
Ind.9             Publishing and Printing Recorded Media  0.183  0.446         0.626        -0.180        0.712 
Ind.10           Man. of Coke, Refined Petroleum Products  0.221  0.525         0.583        -0.058        0.901 
Ind.11   Man. of Chemicals and Chemical Products  0.169  0.531         0.601        -0.070        0.884 
Ind.12           Man. of Rubber and Plastic Production  0.186  0.500         0.583        -0.084        0.857 
Ind.13           Man. of Other Non-metallic Mineral Products  0.188  0.556         0.645        -0.088        0.863 
Ind.14           Man. of Basic Metals  0.178  0.579         0.613        -0.035        0.943 
Ind.15           Man. of Fabricated Metal Products  0.148  0.577         0.689        -0.113        0.837 
Ind.16           Man. of Other Machinery and Equipment  0.160  0.523         0.619        -0.096        0.844 
  29Ind.17           Man. of Computers and Office Machinery  0.163  0.498         0.580        -0.082        0.859 
Ind.18          Man. of Electrical Machinery and Furniture   0.170  0.512         0.604        -0.092        0.847 
Ind.19          Man. of Electronics, Radio, Television   0.156  0.527         0.611        -0.084        0.862 
Ind.20           Man. of Medical Instruments  0.149  0.517         0.583        -0.065        0.888 
Ind.21           Man. of Motor Vehicles and Trailers  0.173   0.595         0.664        -0.069        0.895 
Ind.22           Man. of Other Transport Equipment  0.200  0.692         0.736        -0.044        0.940 
Ind.23           Man. of Furniture  0.175  0.581         0.710        -0.130        0.818 
Ind.24           Refer to Appendix C  0.169  0.658         0.715        -0.058        0.919 
Panel D. Sample mean and standard deviations by size of firm: 
1              0.155  0.538         0.653        -0.116        0.823 
2              0.156  0.560         0.623        -0.062        0.900 
3              0.164  0.557         0.621        -0.065        0.896 
4              0.174  0.575         0.647        -0.072        0.888 
5              0.198  0.637         0.693        -0.055        0.920 
Panel E. Sample mean and standard deviations by chaebol affiliation: 
0              0.163  0.553         0.634        -0.081        0.873 
1              0.202  0.673         0.710        -0.037        0.948 
Panel F. Sample mean and standard deviations: 
Mean    Mean   0.170         0.576         0.648         0.175        0.832 
Std dev    Standard Deviation  0.057         0.209         0.187         0.163        0.213  
 
  30Table 5. Pearson correlation coefficients, based on unrestricted dynamic model, 9604 observations. 
    Year  size  optimal  observed   opt. ratio  distance  delta  chaebol 
year    1.0000   
  
 
size   0.3974    1.0000  
      0.0001   
 
optimal    -0.3566    0.1562    1.0000  
    0.0001     0.0001  
 
observed    -0.2248   0.0763    0.5467    1.0000   
    0.0001    0.0001    0.0001  
 
opt. ratio   -0.3099    0.0940    0.7338   -0.0585   1.0000   
    0.0001    0.0001    0.0001    0.0001  
 
distance    0.2538     -0.0717     -0.4691      0.0491     -0.7512    1.0000   
    0.0001    0.0001      0.0001     0.0001    0.0001  
 
delta   -0.2274    0.2876    0.0987   -0.0718    0.1867   -0.2017    1.0000  
    0.0001    0.0001    0.0001   0.0001    0.0001    0.0001   
 
Chaebol    -0.0022 0.4787 0.2234 0.1580 0.1292    -0.1031 0.2623 1.0000 
  0.8334 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001   
P value shown below coefficient. 
  31Appendix A. Summary statistics by sub-periods. 
Variable   Mean   Std Dev   Mean   Std Dev    Mean    Std Dev 
   1985-1989   1990-1996   1997-2002 
   N=2161   N=3994   N=3449 
A. Dependent variable: 
Leverage ratio     0.693        0.155    0.664    0.159     0.602  0.222 
 
B. Independent variables: 
growth  17.378 16.460 13.981 15.601 -0.739 32.781 
tangibility  0.341 0.165 0.338 0.166 0.370 0.188 
profitability  0.039 0.062 0.019 0.118  -0.007 0.566 
non  debt  tax  shield  0.189 0.146 0.201 0.168 0.195 0.182 
uniqueness  0.794 0.129 0.802  0.13 0.829 0.272 
variability  15.522 141.331  14.743 137.554  14.689 137.053 
equity  48306558 312618933 115327976 580212499 314748804  1578814759 
total  liability  111155284 417200430 268859328 877160389 519678130  1759324403 
tangible  82873342 589581290 181710900  1050569727 397504605  2149751774 
intangible  674945 4482371 1110939 6754630  11280712  110695644 
investment  17158648 53215289 52803185  166656762  153283414  574034072 
 
C. Characteristic variables: 
scurliabil  0.645 0.175 0.631 0.159 0.638 0.211 
shgovern  0.087 1.865 0.195 3.340 0.326 3.363 
shallcorp 15.92  22.318  27.97 22.284 28.546 21.644 
shforeig  1.327 6.037 3.657 7.827 5.236  11.225 
shindivi  37.932 38.644 49.087 31.000 62.264 26.952 
shtotal  55.252 49.735 80.896 39.317 96.463 18.475 
shminor  30.813 31.337 45.719 27.228 45.844 20.408 
shmajor  15.772 18.207 22.254 17.125 27.984 18.426 
trend  3.533 1.115 9.013 1.999  15.500 1.708 
chaebol  0.187 0.390 0.188 0.391 0.186 0.389 
size (log assets)  17.557  1.387  18.478  1.384  19.134  1.420 
size1  very  small  0.406 0.491 0.147 0.354 0.038 0.191 
size2  small  0.242 0.428 0.232 0.422 0.149 0.356 
size3  medium  0.146 0.353 0.222 0.415 0.222 0.416 
size4  large  0.115 0.319 0.193 0.395 0.275 0.447 






  32Appendix B. Debt ratio by period and by Chaebol affiliation 
Sample  Total  Period 1  Period 2  Period 3 
Period  1985-2002 1985-1989   1990-1996    1997-2002 
A. Total Sample: 
N  9604 2161   3994    3449 
Debt Ratio (Mean)  0.648  0.690    0.660    0.600 
Debt Ratio (Std.Dev)  0.187  0.160    0.160    0.220 
 
B. Chaebol Sample: 
N  1796 404   751    641 
Debt Ratio (Mean)  0.710  0.737    0.749    0.645 
Debt Ratio (Std.Dev)  0.154  0.149    0.116    0.174 
 
C. Non-Chaebol Sample: 
N  7808 1757   3243    2808 
Debt Ratio (Mean)  0.634  0.683    0.644    0.592 
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Appendix C. Industry Classification 
Industrial code   Code     Industry 
05000 1  Fishing 
10000  1  Mining of Coal, Crude Petroleum and Natural resources 
11000  1  Mining of Metal Ores 
15000  2  Manufacture of Food Products and Beverage   
16000  3  Manufacture of Tobacco Products 
17000  4  Manufacture of Textiles, Except Sewn Wearing 
18000  5  Manufacture of Sewn Wearing Apparel and Fur Articles 
19000  6  Tanning and Dressing of Leather , Manufacturing of Luggage and Footwear 
20000  7  Manufacture of Wood and of Products of Wood and Cork, Except Furniture; 
     and Manufacture of Articles of Straw and Plaiting Materials 
21000  8  Manufacture of Pulp, Paper and Paper Products 
22000  9  Publishing, Printing and Reproduction of Recorded Media 
23000  10  Manufacture of Coke, Refined Petroleum Products and Nuclear Fuel 
24000  11  Manufacture of Chemicals and Chemical Products 
25000  12  Manufacture of Rubber and Plastic Production 
26000  13  Manufacture of Other Non-metallic Mineral Products 
27000  14  Manufacture of Basic Metals 
28000  15  Manufacture of Fabricated Metal Products 
29000  16  Manufacture of Other Machinery and Equipment 
30000  17  Manufacture of Computers and Office Machinery 
31000  18  Manufacture of Electrical Machinery and Furniture 
32000  19  Manufacture of Electronic Components, Radio, Television 
     and Communication Equipment and Apparatuses 
33000  20  Manufacture of Medical, Precision and Optical Instruments, Watches and Clocks 
34000  21  Manufacture of Motor Vehicles, Trailers and Semitrailers 
35000  22  Manufacture of Other Transport Equipment 
36000  23  Manufacture of Furniture; Manufacturing of Articles n.e.c. 
40000  24  Electricity, Gas, Steam and Hot Water Supply 
45000 24  General  Construction 
50000  24  Sale of Motor Vehicles and Motorcycles ; 
51000  24  Wholesale Trade and Commission Trade, Except of Motor Vehicles and Motorcycles 
52000  24  Retail Trade, Except Motor Vehicles and Motorcycles 
60000  24  Land Transport ; Transport Via Pipelines 
61000 24  Water  Transport 
62000 24  Air  Transport 
63000  24  Supporting and Auxiliary Transport Activities of Travel Agencies 
64000  24  Post and Telecommunications 
72000  24  Computer and Related Activities 
74000 24  Professional,  Scientific and Technical Services 
75000  24  Business Support Services 
87000  24  Motion Picture, Broadcasting and Performing Arts Industries 
Based on Korea Standard Industry Classification.  
 
 